













In the traditional debate between realism and antirealism, or more broadly speaking, in any traditional systematic account of aspects of science, such as scientific explanation and confirmation, scientific theories or their constituent statements are assumed to be simply either true or false.  This is understandably derived from the benchmark in philosophy of language in the analytic tradition, which may be traced back to Russell and the logical positivists, among others, in the early part of 20th century.  Scientific theories are or aim at factual statements about natural phenomena, and therefore the statements are either true of false.  The notion of idealization or approximation was rarely invoked.  More recent participants of this debate seem to have noticed this neglect, and phrases such as ‘approximately true’ began to appear in place of “true” in the literature; but the change is merely cosmetic: the phrases are added merely to extend the applicability of conclusions obtained by arguments that take no notice of approximation or idealization.  What I can gather in reading philosophers such as Richard Boyd (1983), who uses ‘true or approximately true’ rather than simply ‘true’ consistently in his writings, is either of the following two senses.  A theory or a law statement in question either (1) is not true but very close to being true or (2) is not yet confirmed to be true but may be so later.  Similarly, philosophers who acknowledge the fact that most, if not all, scientific theories or statements of law are idealized usually take such theories or law statements to differ from the true ones in only negligible degrees (cf. McMullin 1985; Nowak 1972, 1980; Niiniluoto 1986, 1987).  It has been convincingly argued (Liu 2004) that such a notion of idealization is fatally flawed.  
Similar situations occur in approaches of confirmation (or theory testing): most results in the major approaches of confirmation are regarded as easily extendable to approximately true theories or law statements.  For example, if an account of confirmation works for the testing of a ‘true’ theory like Einstein's theory of gravity in general relativity, then it also works for testing the approximately true Newtonian theory of gravity in the appropriate context (cf. Schwartz 1978; Ramsey 1990, 1992).
As I have argued elsewhere, such nonchalant attitudes towards idealization and approximation are not justified, nor are they entirely harmless.  Therefore, I explore in this paper what we can say about such questions as: what does it mean to confirm or disconfirm an idealized theory?  Could an answer to such a question provide an account that is amenable to scientific realism?  These are big and complex questions, whose comprehensive answers are beyond the scope of this paper.  What I shall do to begin the exploration is to critically discuss a particular account (Laymon’s account) that provides, so to speak, a triangulation of approximation/idealization, confirmation, and scientific realism, and figure out where we are and what we still need to do in answering the question about the relationship between confirming idealized theories and scientific realism.  The result is an improvement of the Laymon account by an updated understanding of the conception of idealization and approximation.  With this improvement, it is argued, the account is better able to be used in defending scientific realism.  
To begin with, we have the following problem for idealized theories and realism: if idealized law statements are false, how can there be an independent reality whose goings-on are regarded as obeying such laws?   Moreover, if idealized law statements are false, what sense does it have to try to test and confirm them?  Furthermore, if scientists spend their lifetime looking for laws, how can such laws, being necessarily untrue because of being idealized, deserve their efforts?  To contemplate these problems, one must remember that, on the one hand, idealization is indispensable in theory construction and, and on the other hand, the practice of science contains many cases in which everyone involved knows that the idealized theory/model is not really true of the phenomena s/he is trying to study.
At least two types of idealization coexist in the practice of science.  Knowing the danger of formalization, I shall not attempt at giving definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions; rather I provide here simple examples to illustrate their differences.  Hypothetically, when idealization is used to draw up the model of ideal gas, from which Boyle's law is obtained, scientists know that the model is false of real gases and Boyle’s law is no real law of physics.  There might be alternative attitudes towards the model, and one of the more plausible attitudes may take it only as a guide in the direction towards the real law, but no one would take the model as a true reflection of real diluted gases.  However, when idealization is used to obtain the notion of inertial motion, from which the first law of Newtonian mechanics is obtained, scientists know that the model of motion on a frictionless plane is true and real (cf. Jevons 1874; Schwartz 1978; Barr 1971, 1974).  (This latter example is not the most ideal because of complications with the Mach principle and general relativity.  A better example is perhaps the law of motion of a charged body, which is under the electromagnetic influence alone, or some such cases​[1]​.)  The point here is of course about the truth, not just the idealized or approximate truth, of the linear compositionality of causal influences.  Because of the enormous complexity of actual phenomena, idealization is needed in the case of inertial motion to 'decompose' causal factors, each of which may be governed by a unique set of laws alone (cf. Liu 2004).  This case is at least on the surface different from the idealization that “invents” ideal gas from real diluted gases.  
First let us observe that neither is the ideal gas model the result of a trivial act that merely neglects the negligible (or adds the imperceptible) nor are completely isolated systems and the laws they instantiate regarded as false just because they are results of idealization.  Both are typical examples of large classes of idealized models widely used in science and technology.  Therefore, when idealizations are introduced, the results are neither necessarily trivial nor necessarily false.  
Moreover, three philosophical attitudes seem to be possible regarding the models that are exemplified by these two examples and the theories that they spawn.  One may think and argue that all idealizations are essentially of the first type, and if so, one may be more inclined towards antirealism regarding scientific theories.  Or one may think and argue that all idealizations are essentially of the second type, and if so, one may be more inclined to realism regarding scientific theories.  Or one may think and argue that there are two types of idealizations and they are fundamentally different, and if so, one’s understanding of the nature of idealized theories does nothing to incline one towards either ‘ism.  
We should be clear at the outset that the notion of scientific realism in this discussion is a rather circumscribed one.  A complaint may be lodged against this discussion by pointing out that a debate over metaphysical positions can be made independent of whether theories are idealized or not.  Hence, to avoid confusion, let me state as clearly as I can what I take to be the topic at issue regarding scientific realism.  It is not purely a metaphysical dispute about whether any systems studied in science exist independent of the study; rather I take it that both realists and antirealists agree that objects such as the sun and the moon exist independently of how they are known; and also they agree that the ideal gas as given in Boyle’s model does not exist in the same sense.  The dispute is rather about the existence of theoretical or unobservable entities and statements about them.  Do they exist in the same sense as the sun or the moon exists?  Further, are the truth-makers of statements about such entities facts that obtain independently of our conception of them?    

II. Laymon's account for confirming idealized theories
More than anyone in the philosophy of science literature, Ron Laymon  (cf. Laymon 1980, 1984/1982, 1985, 1989) has contributed amply to the above problematic, and he is therefore an exception.  From the 1980s on, Laymon has single-handedly identified the various issues related to the general problem and provided ingenious ways to resolve them.  His account is an attempt to triangulate the conception of idealized theories with the problem of their confirmation and of scientific realism.  In Laymon 1980, the project is announced as follows.

My theses in stark unqualified form are these.  First, explanations…consist of two parts: (1) an idealized or simplified deductive-nomological sketch…and (2) an auxiliary argument or set of arguments made showing that if the idealizations of the sketch are improved, i.e., made more exact or realistic, then the prediction of the idealized sketch will be correspondingly more exact and realistic.  I shall refer to this second component as the modal auxiliary, since the argument purports to show that an improved idealized sketch is possible.  My second thesis is that confirmation and disconfirmation occur in the realm of the modal auxiliaries.  That is, a theory is confirmed if it can be shown that it is possible to improve its idealized sketches (Laymon 1980, p. 338).

On the realism connection, Laymon says,

I shall now consider the consequences of the above sort of converging counterfactual theory of confirmation for the issue of scientific realism.  Realist and antirealist perhaps can agree on this methodological point: proceeds as if one were developing ever more accurate descriptions of an existing reality.  Given this agreement, an argument for realism is that cases of successful convergence to better experimental fit are miraculous coincidences for the antirealist (Laymon, 1984, p. 118)

Laymon has had several later occasions to revise and enhance his account on the confirmation of idealized theories and its contribution to the support of scientific realism, and my summary below comes from this body of his work (cf. Laymon 1984/1982, 1985, 1989).  
The general form of an idealized theory is given as follows.  If a system were in I, it would be T, where I is a set of ideal conditions and T the theory that tells how the system would behave under I.  For example, if a block moving on a hard smooth surface with an initial speed were to be subject to no friction, it would continue to move along the same direction with the same speed forever.  Or, if a tank of gas were ideal gas under normal circumstances, its thermal states, states described by values of the gas's pressure, volume, and temperature, would be determined by Boyle's law (Laymon 1984, 1989; see also Weston 1987, 1992).  Ideal conditions – the ones that circumscribe the exact extent to which the system in question behaves exactly according to the theory/laws – are not initial/boundary conditions (“i/b conditions,” henceforth), although i/b conditions are usually also idealized for the convenience of inferences.  They are the imaginary conditions in which the idealized theory “works perfectly.”  With friction and other complicating factors, such as the different sizes and interactions among real gas molecules, in place, whatever law statements or theory one has, they would not apply exactly to concrete cases with definite i/b conditions.  Once such factors are removed in the act of idealization, they would apply exactly.  
Although Laymon sometime speaks about idealizing i/b conditions, I think it is better to keep them apart.  By a stipulation in the current discussion, if a theory were not idealized it would give realistic predictions under physically possible i/b conditions.  It seems right to say that i/b conditions can also be idealized, but they are certainly not ideal conditions, I, that produce idealized theories.  It might be correct to say that the distinction between ideal conditions and (non-idealized) i/b conditions is that the latter are always physical possible while the former may not.  If there are deeper problems with this distinction, they are for other occasions.  
As to the question of whether the theory, T, is simply false because of the ideal conditions, Laymon's answer is given most clearly in his critical response to Nancy Cartwright’s view.  Cartwright (1983) argued under the slogan “how laws of physics lie” that laws of physics can only be understood as true in the models that are made for them and the models, being idealized, never actually exist.  Laymon’s response (1989) is that the laws are true, but the models are false to natural systems, and the two together do not make practical predictions (even when given true i/b conditions) that produce the ‘experimental fit’ that is meant to confirm the theory (more on this last point later).
To the question of how an idealized theory is to be tested -- confirmed or disconfirmed – Laymon’s account proceeds as follows.    Suppose that our theory, T, consists of law-statements that, when supplied with initial and boundary conditions, yield empirically testable predictions; and suppose again that T is idealized, which means that there are some set of ideal conditions (statements) Id such that T is true with Id and not true without it.  In other words, given the appropriate i/b conditions, T and Id implies P, a prediction that we can test in an experiment.  Suppose again there is a set of theories, T = {Tj | j = 1, 2, …, N} where T  T and N is a natural number; and correspondingly, there is a set of ideal conditions Id = {Ij | j = 1, 2, …, N} that forms a strict descending order of idealness such that, given the same set of i/b conditions, Ti and Ii yields Pi, where Pi   P = {Pj | j = 1, 2, …, N} is a testable result in the same experiment.  This prediction-making scheme does not have to be understood as a simple Hypothetical-Deductive (H-D) scheme, although it could be; it represents any scheme of theory testing that goes from to-be-tested theory together with all the auxiliaries to the testing results.  This, roughly, is what Laymon refers to as the “deductive-nomological sketch” in the first of the two quotes above.  The descending order of idealness is also defined very broadly such that it ought to be able to accommodate any practical acts of gradually removing or weakening an idealization.  Next, let PE be a set of data from the experiment that tests T.  PE is almost certainly not the result of a single trial but of some standard statistical treatment of a set of trials; and it may or may not be a member of P.  The confirmation relation is one between the T and PE such that to confirm idealized theories is to take confirmation as the improvability of approximation under idealization.  In other words, an idealized theory is found to be confirmed if it is shown that relaxing its idealness (making it more realistic) improves upon the approximation of its predictions (towards PE).  One way of making this more precise (as in what he calls 'having monotonicity' (Laymon 1985, 213-4)) is to have the following.  

[L]	Tk, for any 1  k  N, is confirmed if for any Ti and Tj in T, where k < i < j ≤ N, we have |Pj  - PE| < |Pi - PE| (i.e. Pj is closer to PE than Pi whenever Ti is less idealized than Tj); otherwise, Tk is disconfirmed. 

This version essentially says that P must form a strictly ordered set that matches the same strict (descending) order in T (which is induced by the original descending order of Id).  This is precisely what is meant for an idealized theory to approbate approximation monotonically.  
Some initial comments on this account are in order.  It appears to be too strong; the requirement of monotonicity does not seem necessary.  What one needs is something weaker; but how to weaken it with rigor is not an easy matter.  One simple modification of [L] is to say that for Tk to be confirmed is for some Ti and Tj in T, where k< i < j ≤ N, we have |Pj  - PE| < |Pi - PE|.  But is this too weak?  It depends on how Id is constructed.  Suppose we look at the ideal gas case.  Two kinds of idealization are essential to the model: vanish the size of gas molecules and banish the interactions among molecules.  Suppose it turns out that Boyle's law approbates approximation when the stipulation on molecule sizes is relaxed but it does not do that when we only reintroduce collisions and/or interaction forces.  Would we still regard Boyle's law as confirmed since it obviously satisfied the weaker version of [L]?  
Here is a plausible proposal: we can simply use the notion of a limit to characterize it, namely, for any positive number, , there is a natural number N after which the difference between the N+1 term of the prediction and PE is equal or smaller than .  This does not require monotonicity, and the improvement process may suffer frequent deviations; but as long as the process forms a dense sequence, approximation approbation is counted as successful.    
There are other problems with this account which I shall discuss shortly, but if we dismiss it as unrealistic because there may be actual cases of theory confirmation that do not fit it perfectly, we are doing philosophy of science a disservice.  It has often happened in the history of philosophy of science, that certain formalized accounts of a practice in science, such as Hempel's D-N model of explanation, are rejected wholesale, namely together with the intuitions that ground the accounts in question, just because there are actual cases that do not fit into their formal details.  In other words, they are rejected simply because they are idealized account of some practice of science.  I regard this as an unfortunate situation.  In this aspect, scientists are much wiser than philosophers, although it sounds a very odd thing to say.  If one compares many philosophers' treatment of Hempel's D-N model with physicists’ treatment of such laws as Boyle's ideal gas law, one will see that one should not simply abandon the earlier and more idealized accounts of explanation or confirmation just because they are too idealized, but use them in situations that they approximate.  
It is obvious from the second quote above that Laymon means to use his account of confirmation to mount an inference to the best explanation (IBE) argument for a realist stance for idealized theories (see also Brown 1985).  [L] supports scientific realism because otherwise, it would be difficult to understand why confirmation of an idealized theory should approbate approximation.  If it is not a fact in a world whose goings-on are independent of us that a body moves in a straight line with constant speed if isolated from all external influence, how can we explain the fact, the observable fact, that by gradually adding friction and by checking its effects on the moving body, the predictions match the experimental results?  Hence, approximation approbation supports realism via IBE. 
In connection with the realism issue, Laymon offers two further important points.  First is the point that the realism/antirealism debate is really about theoretical entities.  It is difficult to take an antirealist view seriously if it says that ever more accurate mechanical account of the earth movement in the solar system is not really about an existing earth but a theoretical construct.  But if we replace 'the earth' with 'an electron' in the statement, the view cannot be so easily dismissed.  And the second is an easily anticipated objection raised by Laymon himself.  What if ‘[t]here were,…, increasingly more realistic theories of phlogiston’ (Laymon 1984, p. 119)?  Shouldn’t the realists have to say that phlogistons are real and the phlogistic theory of combustion is approximately true?  
	
III. Assessing Laymon's account
First, some friendly amendments to Laymon’s account are in order to make it more robust.  One obvious feature of this account of confirmation is that it is a theory that depends on a more basic conception of confirmation.  Laymon offers us through his modal auxiliary scheme an account for confirming idealized theories, but it will not work unless we are clear about what it means for each consecutive theory, Tk  T to be confirmed or disconfirmed.  Otherwise, we will not understand what it means for confirming a theory by a set of modal auxiliaries that specifies counterfactually how the theory would behave when the idealization is relaxed.  Therefore, Laymon's account of confirmation, even if correct, must be supplemented by a confirmation theory of the normal kind, namely, a H-D, a Bayesian, a Boot-strapping, or some such model that tells us what it takes to confirm or disconfirm each Tk  T.   Let us look at the simplest example of the basic confirmation scheme, namely, the H-D scheme.  Since this is only an exercise in showing how Laymon’s account must ultimately depend on a basic account, it should not matter very much which basic account we select to offer such a demonstration.  Take any one theory from T, Tk.  It together with i/b conditions and auxiliaries produces a prediction, Pk, which is not found among the observations but is not too different from them.  Depending on where Tk is in the ordered set T, the corresponding closeness of Pk to the actual experimental results can be estimated.  If the closeness matches the expectation, we can regard Tk as confirmed.  If this is so for all k, 1  k  N, we say that there is confirmation.  If too many of the k’s in which Tk’s prediction Pk deviate from a gradual progression towards PE, then we do not have confirmation.  So, at least the H-D scheme can be introduced as the basic scheme to complete Laymon’s account.  I leave the questions of whether using a Bayesian account or a Boot-strapping account may also be worked out to support Laymon’s account as an exercise for the reader.  The intuition is that it should work out because there does not seem to be anything in either of those accounts that goes in principle against incremental closeness of matching experimental findings to predictions.  
Further, this part does not have to be conceived as entirely comprising modal auxiliaries, although Laymon is right to insist that it is sufficient to have established the possibility of approximation approbation.  An idealized theory or law statement is ‘confirmed’ in this part of confirmation if the relaxation of the ideal conditions is conceivable and the approximation approbation is demonstrable under that conception.  However, the opposite direction also and often serves as the objective for theory testing.  Although they may in principle be unrealizable in a lab, ideal conditions in many cases can certainly be asymptotically neared.  Perhaps it is already implied in Laymon's account, for it hardly needs any originality to see it, but we can certainly imagine situations in which experimental scientists pursue a strategy of inching ever closer to the ideal conditions and see if results approach the ideal prediction monotonically.  Rather than reintroducing friction in a gradual progression and see how a certain system behave as a result, experimenters often do the opposite, by gradually removing friction and see if the results approaches the ideal asymptotically.  
Here, the term, ‘direction of fit,’ in epistemology seems to be just right for illustrating this point.  Laymon's account only looks at one direction of fit in the business of confirmation, namely, the desire to fit one's belief to the already experienced external world.  One may desire to pursue the opposite direction, namely, the desire to fit the world to one's belief by way of arranging one's environment so that one experiences results that asymptotically approach what one firmly believes.  This latter point lends support, as we will see in a moment, to the idea, to which Laymon has partially signed on, that an idealized theory may be TRUE as the asymptote, rather than only approximately true.  This is one main reason for rejecting Cartwright’s idea that all idealized theories or models are false by default.  
And because of the added other direction of fit, let us first note the following simple and important point.  It makes sense to gradually reduce the strength of friction, for example, but it does not make sense to gradually shrink the sizes of gas molecules (or to find actual gases with asymptotically smaller molecules).  So, the distinction between the two types of idealizations mentioned in the beginning of the paper becomes prominent.  
With this point broached, let us now return to Laymon’s first point I mentioned earlier, namely, the realism/antirealism debate is really about theoretical entities; and therefore an idealized molecule or electron may, but an idealized earth does not, threaten realism.  A number of questions arise from this point.  First, as mentioned in section I, we can separate two types of idealized objects: one type results in theories or laws, such as Boyle's law, that “no one” would regard as true of nature, but the other type results in theories or laws, such as the first law of Newtonian mechanics, that scientists usually regard as true of nature.  Does this mean that Laymon’s rejection of Cartwright’s view in defense of realism applies only to certain types of idealized theories but not to all?  It seems reasonable to think those theories or law-statements that scientists themselves regard as false are results of physically impossible ideal conditions.  Molecules cannot be without size nor can (actual) electrons be all identical, where 'can not' means physically impossible.  But completely isolated objects or systems may not be actual but are nonetheless physically possible.  Secondly, an idealized theory of an observable system does not seem to threaten realism because what is claimed as real is the system that we can all observe; it is not the idealized model, which is an artifact we use for convenience to discuss the real thing.  And this appears to be how we should understand a theory of our solar system (containing idealized models and laws applicable to them) and why it is not really a thread to realism.  The need for idealizing the system is that otherwise we can only either say something general and vague about it so that we say something true or say something exact about it that is not exactly true.  
This does not seem to be the case at all for electrons or other theoretical/unobser-vable objects.  We may wonder with good reasons whether electrons under our current theory are results of idealization.  Do we know what the ideal conditions are for electrons?  Because of this, the realist may be hard put to answer the question: what exactly is the thing that is supposed to be real or exist independently of our conception of it?  Given how empirically underdetermined our models for the unobservables often are, it is difficult indeed to argue that there independently exist electrons or other unobservables that our idealized theory approximately depict.  Therefore, the antirealists may have a case against the realists on theoretical entities because in order to be a realist about them, one has to either believe what exists is exactly like the model in our theory or know what the thing is like from which the model in our theory is an idealization.  Since we cannot in principle know what factors from which and what degrees to which the idealization is drawn in these cases, neither of the above is a tenable position.  
The distinction between observables and unobservables has been a controversial issue in philosophy of science.  Some argue that the distinction, though useful on many occasions, has no philosophical grounds, but others argue for the opposite.  Even among those who believe in the distinction, some do not know how, or think it is possible, to argue for it.  Van Fraassen (1980) has an argument for the distinction in terms of possible direct observations; but it seems here is another argument for the distinction.  Observa-bles have or may have models that are explicitly idealized objects.  We have a good idea of why and how the idealized observables in our theory got there.  This is not true at all with the unobservables.  We can't even be certain which features of the unobservables are the results of idealization and which are not.  For instance, we have identical elementary particles in our theory.  Is being identical an idealization or a real feature of the particles?  It could be sensibly regarded as an idealization, essentially the same as the idealization in Boyle’s ideal gas in which not only molecules are made sizeless; they are also made identical.  However, it may also seem impossible to regard it as such.  Here is one of the reasons why it seems so.  If we compare classical gases (of which Boyle’s ideal gas is one) with quantum gases, we know that the former obey the Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics and the latter the Bose-Einstein statistics, and they are fundamentally different conceptions of statistics.  Classical gases have idealized identical particles (which are in fact not identical), and therefore they keep their identity while not having any relevant differences registered in the theory.  If a quantum gas’s particles’ lack of identity is also an idealization, then the statistics should be the same as in the classical case; but no, the Bose-Einstein statistics is incompatible with the Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics, which seems to strongly suggest that the identity of elementary particles is not an idealization but a “real” feature of them.  

Let me now explain an unexpected benefit of Laymon's account.  If we think of idealization as an act that neglects the negligible in theory construction, Laymon's modal account matches well with an approach in the philosophical literature on approximate truth.  Risto Hilpinen (1976) characterizes an approximately true proposition as one that is true in some other possible world that is close to the actual world, where the sense of closeness is essentially a Lewisian notion (á la David Lewis).  One can certainly imagine a metric and a cutoff point in some formal sense that supply a criterion that separates approximate propositions from not even approximate ones.  Complications aside, one can in general regard good idealized law-statements as expressing propositions that are (at least) approximately true and bad ones as propositions that are not even approximately true.  I assume that the reverse is not true for the obvious parallel reason that all law statements are true but not all true statements are law-statements. 
There is a problem with Hilpinen's conception of approximate truth, namely, when a proposition is about some theoretical objects, how is it possible to even in principle come up with a measure of closeness between the world in which the approximate proposition is true and the actual world?  Since, for example, it is not possible to “witness” what molecules or electrons are actually like, how do we know whether the idealized ones are close to the actual ones or not?  I think Laymon's account at least goes in some ways towards solving this problem.  Of course, we can never directly experience what electrons are like; but if we have a model for them and the model approbates approximation in the observable predictions the model of electrons yields via a theory, then the possible worlds in which electrons are like the ones in our model is closer to the actual world than the ones in which electrons are different.  Still, the radical underdetermination problem threatens such a realist solution, since it assumes that the idealization involved in our model of electrons is essentially of the same type as the idealization involved in our model of the moon (cf. Popper 1976; Oddie 1981, 1986).  

IV. Two Types of Idealization and the Unobservable
Let us go back to one of our original questions.  If idealized theories or law statements are false, in what sense can we regard it as confirmed or disconfirmed?  Doesn’t the notion of confirming something simply mean confirming that it is true?  If like most people who, when confronted with this question, say that confirming something really means confirming that it is true or approximate true, where the latter means 'true enough,' why do we even need Laymon's account then?  In fact, if the theories or law statements are obviously true enough in the sense that the deviation is negligible, then the idealization is necessarily so trivial that it is often not even mentioned.  For example, in ordinary circumstances, the difference between non-relativistic mechanics and relativistic mechanics is so small that whatever confirms the one confirms the other. In other words, the confirming evidence in such circumstances is not likely to be sensitive enough to distinguish the two.  In this case, scientists do not even consider the non-relativistic mechanics as an idealized theory.  But frictionless planes or regions without gravity are not just neglecting the negligible, and such assumptions will certainly create considerable discrepancies in the testing results.  In such cases, what does it mean to confirm idealized theories that are false?  Now the question is: are statements about frictionless objects or fields in regions without gravity necessarily false statements?  As I have discussed earlier, Cartwright (1983) thinks they are indeed false, but Laymon thinks that some of them are not, and I have supplied earlier the reasons for why I agree with him.  
What about law statements such as Boyle's law, which we should all agree are not true in any sense of being true?  The best way to regard statements of this sort is to think of them not as law-statement but as “law-maps.”  It is certainly not false, as a good map of a city is not false, but it is not true either, as the line segments on the map with street names attached are not true of the streets in the city that bear those names.  A good map contains true information about the streets and buildings in the city it represents; it is their spatial relations and orientations, etc. that must be displayed correctly for a map to give such true information.  And the notion of confirming a map, or one map being better confirmed than another, is not hard to define either.  Some philosophers want to argue that all scientific theories are like maps.  I think the idea is not so much wrong as is too sweeping to be literally correct.  One often ends up, in trying to argue for such a sweeping claim, distorting the sense of maps so much so that the analogy loses its grip on our imagination.  But law-statements such as Boyle's law are like maps in the most straightforward sense.
Therefore, harking back to the insight of the two opposite directions of fit I mentioned earlier, one can be a realist and maintain that there is a clear distinction between the two types of idealization.  And then theories involving one kind can be true in accordance with the correspondence theory of truth and theories involving the other kind can never be true; and the latter theories are not real theories but rather theoretical maps that are intended to lead us later to real theories (which may only involve idealization of the previous kind).  Let us call the theories or lawlike statements of the first kind ‘theories’ or ‘lawlike statements’, and theories or lawlike statements of the second kind ‘theomaps’ or ‘lawmaps’.  Opposite attitudes should be adopted when regarding these two types of theories.  For theories and lawlike statements, the experimental effort should be primarily given to approximate the conditions under which a theory or lawlike statement in question is literally true.  In our case for the law of inertia, approximation may simply mean getting rid of the friction as much as possible.  For theomaps or lawmaps, we do the opposite: we relax as much as possible the ideal stipulations in them so that new and less idealized theories can be found.  Such theories may have a chance to be true and may produce predications that approximate results in possible experimental conditions.  Both confirmation procedures involve asymptoticity, and yet they are of opposite directions. 
Keeping this distinction in mind, let us now reexamine Laymon's IBE argument for realism.  The argument works if idealization is no more than what Laymon wanted, namely, just to approbate approximation.  It appears to work well for such cases as an idealized earth or other planets in Newtonian mechanics.  In fact, it works well for any cases where the idealized item is an object of which direct or semi-direct observations give us good impressions.  In such cases, what Laymon's argument concludes is actually this: the object of which we make an idealization for the sake of theoretical expediency must be a real object; it must be something that exists independent of us and our theory.  We cannot say that the earth does not exist because its idealized copy in Newtonian mechanics happens to have unreal aspects.  On the contrary, if the real earth does not exist, it would not make much sense to call the earth in Newtonian mechanics an idealization, would it?  This bit of Laymon's reasoning seems harmless enough.   However, scientific realism claims much more than that.  If the earth exists, then there is no reason to think that molecules or electrons do not, for the same reason; and there is also no reason to think that frictionless objects are not real and there is no reason to think that the weak and the strong interactional forces do not actually operate among elementary particles.  Can Laymon’s argument be carried over to these cases?  
To recapitulate: the earth exists independently, but what exists is the earth, not the Newtonian earth, which is nothing but an idealized copy, a fantasy, an idea, no more.  But when we say that a frictionless object exists, what do we mean?  Suppose we replicate Galileo's incline experiment, in which a block is sliding down an incline and then continues its motion on a level plane.  We reduce the friction among all parts and every time we reduce it a little more, the block moves more smoothly and stops further away from the incline.  When we conclude with an idealization that if the friction were completely removed, the block would continue to move with a constant speed forever, what do we claim to be real?  It looks like we have to be saying that the frictionless block is real.  In other words, the idealized block rather than the actual one is real.  This is the sense in which we say that the law of inertia that operates when there is no friction is actually true, not approximately true.  
However, that is not what the above extension of the earth/Newtonian earth case is telling us.  If a frictionless object could be real, why could not a dimensionless molecule be real?  But if the dimensionless molecules could be regarded as real, we arrive at a rather bizarre argument in accordance with Laymon’s modal auxiliaries, which must go as follows.  Because the van de Waals modification of the ideal gas model and of Boyd’s law is empirically successful, the ideal gas is real and Boyle's law is a true law-statement!  Obvious this is not right since van de Waals’ “real” gas model is better than the ideal gas model and the van de Waals law of real gases is closer to the true law for gases.  The way out is to put such idealized objects as dimensionless molecules with the Newtonian earth rather than with frictionless blocks.  Hence, what are real are the molecules in real gases of which the dimensionless molecules in an ideal gas are but mental constructs.  What should we say about electrons and other elementary particles?  It is not clear at all whether Laymon's monotonicity or asymptoticity argument can work with them.  It will depend on whether it is feasible to have future quantum theories of elementary particles that portray the particles “more realistically” in the sense that it is possible to view them as concrete particular or individual things existing in nature.  
Here are a few things regarding the realism-antirealism debate that we can clarify already.  The question in the realism/antirealism debate is about whether the postulated entities in scientific theories do exist in nature.  Since the objects are inevitably represented with idealization, we need to be sure which objects we mean when we try to figure out whether to believe in realism or antirealism.  Are we talking about the idealized objects or are we talking about the objects from which we have made an idealization?  Two types of idealization need to be distinguished: (1) one type ignores what objects could not exist or be real without – such as size and gravity – and (2) the other ignores what objects could exist or be real without but do in fact possess – such as friction and electricity.  This is another, or more general, way of characterizing the same two types of idealization I discussed from the beginning.  For type (1), the realists and the antirealists should agree that the idealized objects could be the objects that exist because what exist are the objects from which idealization is made.  As I argued from the beginning, I shall take antirealism to be a position that grants existence or reality to the obviously observable, such as the ordinary objects.  For type (2), the dispute between realists and antirealists is on the question of whether postulated theoretical/unobservable entities or factors exist or are real in the way our theories describe them.  With idealized entities, the realists cannot say that such entities exist exactly as they are described in the theory, and yet they still can say that they exist in the form when the idealization is removed.  The antirealists of course want to deny (or at least be agnostic about) this, saying that those entities, as they are described or as they are when the idealization is removed, have no existence in reality.  What exists for them are only the ordinary objects or the observables; the rest are mental constructs that theoreticians enlist to organize or “explain” the former.  
The antirealists now have two arguments against realism in this context.  First, given the reasons explained above, it seems that what the realists meant to argue, when they argue for the reality of any postulated objects, is that such objects really exist; they are not just a figment of our imagination.  But these objects are highly idealized.  Do the realist mean to argue that such idealized objects really exist?  Do they believe that electrons and quarks as identical objects, for example, exist in reality?  Or rather they actually meant to say that they don't believe that electrons -- the stuff that are talked about in quantum electrodynamics (QED) -- are real because they are idealized objects, rather they believe as real whatever out there of which electrons are an idealization?  If so, we really do not know what is it that exists, given my earlier argument for the impossibility of knowing what conditions of idealization are taken to come up with the electrons described in QED.  Without that possibility, our idea of that which the model of electrons represent is not clear and substantial enough to help a realist, the same way that Kant's granting the existence of the noumena doesn't make him a realist.  The realists need to come up with a plausible way of fixing what it is of which electrons in QED are idealized copies.
A problem that subsumes the above problem is anticipated by Laymon himself as we mentioned in the beginning, and it is this: what could the realists say about those theoretical objects that were abandoned in the history of science, objects such as phlogistons (Laymon 1984, p. 119)?  There could well be a theory of phlogiston that approbates approximation, and yet there are no such objects.  Laymon's response to this problem on behalf of realism (one of the several he thinks are available to the realists) is simple and in my opinion effective.  The approximation approbation scheme only works within a paradigm or regime; whenever there is paradigm or regime change and, for instance, the phlogiston theory of combustion is replaced by the oxygen theory, the latter is able to explain why the former is approximately true and capable of approbate approximation in a limited and out-of-date scope.  The antirealists would have a hard time explaining why such an explanation is always available for the later theory that replaced an earlier one.  Of course, the realists do not have the last word on this, since it is surely not true that the later theory of a certain phenomenon always explains why the earlier theory works.  Can a later physical theory of lightening and thunder explain why an earlier anthropomorphic theory of them works?  However, at least within the history of mature sciences, what Laymon identifies seems to be prevalent (see also Krajewski 1977; Newton-Smith 1981; Niiniluoto 1984, 1990).  
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^1	  But of course, this is also not completely problem-free because gravitational interaction will always be present.
